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Abstract
NoSQL technologies have become a common component in many information systems and
software applications. These technologies are focused on performance, enabling scalable
processing of large volumes of structured and unstructured data.Unfortunately,most develop-
ments over NoSQL technologies consider security as an afterthought, putting at risk personal
data of individuals and potentially causing severe economic loses as well as reputation crisis.
In order to avoid these situations, companies require an approach that introduces security
mechanisms into their systems without scrapping already in-place solutions to restart all
over again the design process. Therefore, in this paper we propose the first moderniza-
tion approach for introducing security in NoSQL databases, focusing on access control and
thereby improving the security of their associated information systems and applications. Our
approach analyzes the existing NoSQL solution of the organization, using a domain ontology
to detect sensitive information and creating a conceptualmodel of the database. Together with













1 Lucentia Research Group, Department of Software and Computing Systems, University of
Alicante, Alicante, Spain
2 ISTR Research Group, Department of Computer Science and Electronics, University of Cantabria,
Santander, Spain
3 GSyA Research Group, Institute of Information Technologies and Systems, Information Systems and
Technologies Department, University of Castilla-La Mancha, Ciudad Real, Spain
123
2210 A. Maté et al.
designers to identify the security mechanisms that must be incorporated into their existing
solution. For each security issue, our approach automatically generates a proposed solu-
tion, consisting of a combination of privilege modifications, new roles and views to improve
access control. In order to test our approach, we apply our process to a medical database
implemented using the popular document-oriented NoSQL database, MongoDB. The great
advantages of our approach are that: (1) it takes into account the context of the system thanks
to the introduction of domain ontologies, (2) it helps to avoid missing critical access control
issues since the analysis is performed automatically, (3) it reduces the effort and costs of
the modernization process thanks to the automated steps in the process, (4) it can be used
with different NoSQL document-based technologies in a successful way by adjusting the
metamodel, and (5) it is lined up with known standards, hence allowing the application of
guidelines and best practices.
Keywords NoSQL databases · Security · Modernization process · Ontology
1 Introduction
Enormous amounts of data are already present and still rapidly growing due to heteroge-
neous data sources (sensors, GPS and many other types of smart devices). There has been an
increasing interest in the efficient processing of these unstructured data, normally referred to
as “Big Data”, and their incorporation into traditional applications. This necessity has made
that traditional database systems and processing need to evolve and accommodate them.
Therefore, new technologies have arisen focusing on performance, enabling the processing
of large volumes of structured and unstructured data. NoSQL technologies are an exam-
ple of these new technologies and have become a common component in many enterprise
architectures in different domains (medical, scientific, biological, etc.).
We can distinguish four different categories of NoSQL databases: (1) Key/Value, where
data are stored and accessible by a unique key that references a value (e.g., DynamoDB,
Riak, Redis, etc.); (2) Column, similar to the key/value model, but the key consists of a
combination of column, row and a trace of time used to reference groups of columns (e.g.,
Cassandra, BigTable, Hadoop/HBase); (3) Document, in which data are stored in documents
that encapsulate all the information following a standard format such as XML, YAML or
JSON (e.g., MongoDB, CouchDB); (4) graph, the graph theory is applied and expanding
between multiple computers (e.g., Neo4J and GraphBase).
One of the main challenges is that these new NoSQL technologies have focused mainly
on dealing with Big Data characteristics, whereas security and privacy constraints have been
relegated to a secondary place [1–3], thus leading to information leaks causing economic loses
and reputation crisis. The main objective of our research deals with incorporating security
in NoSQL databases, focusing on document databases as a starting point. In this way, this
paper presents the first modernization approach for introducing security in NoSQL document
databases through the improvement of access control.
The proposed approach consists of two stages: (1) the analysis of the existing NoSQL
solution (using a domain ontology and applying natural language processing, NLP) to detect
sensitive data and create a conceptual model of the database (reverse engineering); (2) the
identification of access control issues to be tackled in order to modernize the existing NoSQL
solution. At a later stage, which we will not see in this paper, different transformation rules
for each detected security issue will be applied. These transformation rules will consist on
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a combination of privilege modifications, new roles and the creation of views, which can
be adapted by the database designer. Finally, the implementation of the transformation rules
will be carried out. In order to evaluate our proposal, we have applied it to a medical database
implemented using the document NoSQL database MongoDB.
The great advantages of our framework are that: (1) it takes into account the context of
the system thanks to the introduction of domain ontologies; (2) it helps avoid missing critical
security issues since the analysis is performed automatically; (3) it reduces the effort and
costs of the modernization process thanks to the automated steps in the process; (4) it can
be used with different NoSQL technologies in a successful way by adjusting the metamodel;
and (5) it is lined up with known standards, hence allowing the application of guidelines and
best practices.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• The first general modernization approach for introducing security through improved
access control in NoSQL document databases.We focus on document databases although
our proposal could be applied to other NoSQL technologies, such as columnar and graph-
based databases.
• Our approach adapts to each domain by using an specialized ontology that allows users
to specify the sensitive information.
• The automatic analysis of data and database structure to identify potential security issues.
• The generation of the security enhanced database model, including the automatic gener-
ation of a solution for each access control issue consisting of a combination of privilege
modifications, new roles and views.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 the related work is shown.
Following this, inSect. 3, our framework forNoSQLmodernization including security aspects
is defined. In Sect. 4, our approach is applied to a case study within the medical domain.
Section 5 presents a discussion and limitations of the present work. Finally, Sect. 6 explains
the conclusions and sketches future works.
2 Related work
Given the multiple disciplines involved in our approach, there are several areas that must be
considered as part of the related work.
With respect to security issues in NoSQL databases, different works have been developed.
They address the problemof the inclusion of security policies in this kind of databases (usually
applied in Big Data environments). However, these approaches rarely consider to apply this
kind of policies at the different modeling stages [1–4] or to include security and privacy
restrictions [3,5,6]. For all this, the works currently arise on this topic are proposals that lack
adequate security in terms of confidentiality, privacy and integrity (just to mention a few
properties) in Big Data domains [1,3,4,7].
Other approaches have achieved a proper security in the development of information
systems, but they are not focused on NoSQL databases and their own security problems. In
this sense, themost relevant proposals are listed below: (i) secure TROPOS is an improvement
that provides security for TROPOS methodology [8]. It is focused on software development
which uses intentional goals of agents. (ii) Mokum is an object-oriented system for modeling
[9]. It is based on knowledge and facilitates the definition of security and integrity constraints.
(iii) UMLsec evaluates general security issues using semantics and specifies confidentiality,
integrity needs and access control [10]. (iv) MDS (model-driven security) is a proposal to
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apply themodel-driven approach in high-level systemmodels [11]. It adds security properties
to the model and automatically generates a secure system.
Focusing on Big Data systems we can conclude that the current proposals do not consider
adequately the security concept in all stages. They provide partial security solutions such
as: (i) anonymization and data encryption [12], (ii) description of reputation models [13],
and (iii) authentication and signature encryption [14,15]. Furthermore, many deficiencies for
the implementation of security features in NoSQL databases [6] or in Hadoop ecosystems
[5,16–18] have been detected.
It is important to mention that our proposal follows the standards defined for Big Data
systems. We have mentioned two main approaches: (1) the BIGEU Project (The Big Data
Public Private Forum Project) from the European Union [19] which tries to define a clear
strategy for the successful use and exploitation of Big Data in our society, aligned with the
objectives of the Horizon 2020 program; (2) the NIST (National Institute of Standards and
Technology, USA) standard [16] which proposes a reference architecture for Big Data, where
it identifies a component corresponding to the Big Data application.
With respect to the BIGEU Project, our stages can be aligned with the ones used in the Big
Data Value Chain. TheNoSQL database analysis corresponds to data acquisition and analysis
(making special emphasis in the use of ontologies and NLP techniques). Our modeling stage
(conceptual model creation and security issues list) can be matched to the data curation and
storage stages. Finally, the automatic generation of the solution is related to the data usage
stage. Regarding the NIST architecture, different stages of the information value chain (col-
lection, preparation/curation, analytics and access) are defined in the Big Data component
(similar to the previously mentioned stages of BIGEU). The NIST big data reference archi-
tecture has been extended to integrate security issues [20]. Our approach is also aligned with
this security reference architecture for big data, through components such as the security
requirement, security metadata and security solution. We can conclude that the presented
architectures take into account the specific characteristics of Big Data systems, oriented and
directed by the data, defining the stages of its value chain. These standardization efforts are
considered in our proposal that will be aligned with the aforementioned architectures.
Furthermore, with regard to conceptual modeling and semantics, several works present
the use of ontologies in conceptual modeling.Weber presents how ontological theories can be
used to informconceptualmodeling research, practice, andpedagogy [21].Thegeneral formal
ontology (GFO) is a foundational ontology which integrates objects and processes and is
designed for applications of diverse areas such asmedical, biological, biomedical, economics,
and sociology [22]. A comparison between traditional conceptual modeling and ontology-
driven conceptual modeling was made in the work of Verdonck et al. [23], demonstrating that
there do exist meaningful differences between adopting the two techniques because higher-
quality models are obtained using the ontology-driven conceptual modeling. However, to the
best of our knowledge, here we present the first use of ontologies to improve the security in
NoSQL databases by detecting sensitive information.
As shown, there have been advances in several areas that make possible to provide a
modernization process to incorporate security in existing NoSQL databases. However, after
carrying out this review of the literature related to these topics, it is evident that our research is
the firstmodernization approach for introducing security inNoSQLdatabaseswhich automat-
ically identifies and enables security mechanisms that were not considered during the initial
implementation. Furthermore, our approach adapts to each domain by using an ontology that
allows users to specify what information can be considered sensitive or highly sensitive.
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3 Amodernization approach for NoSQL document databases
The proposed approach (see Fig. 1) consists on two stages: (1) the process of reverse engi-
neering to create a conceptual model of the database and the analysis of the existing NoSQL
solution to detect sensitive information; (2) the identification of security issues to modernize
the existing NoSQL solution. These stages will be detailed in the following subsections.
3.1 Reverse engineering
The modernization process starts with a reverse engineering of the database. The aim of
the reverse engineering process is to obtain an abstracted model that allows us to reason
and identify security issues that would be the target of security improvements. In order to
perform this process, we require a metamodel that represents the structures in the DB. One
such metamodel is the one presented across Fig. 2.
The excerpt of the metamodel shown in Fig. 2 is divided into two parts. The upper part
corresponds to the database structures and contains the main elements of NoSQL document
databases, whereas the lower part corresponds to the security actions (modifications) to
be made in order to improve access control. Since we work with MongoDB, the database
metamodel is tailored to MongoDB structures and datatypes and is defined as follows:
The first element in the metamodel is the Database element, which acts as root of the
model. A database may have a name and has associated any number of Collections (Views),
Roles and Users.
Each Collection has a name and establishes an id that enables the identification of each
document. A Collection can have several Documents, each of which may have several fields,
some of which can be required for all the documents within the collection. Each Field can
be a SimpleField, storing a basic type of value, or a compose field, storing other collections
within it. Finally, each field may have a constraint applied to it.
Aside from collections, a MongoDB database may store views. A View has a name and a











Fig. 1 Scheme of NoSQL modernization process
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Fig. 2 Metamodel for Document-based Databases & MongoDB
Projections enable us to hide or show certain fields, andmay involve conditions that determine
whether an instance of the field is included or excluded. Moreover, a View can include
aggregation operations to derive newdynamicfields obtained from the underlying collections.
To manage the access to the data stored within the different collections, the database may
establish a Role-based system. A Role has a name and a series of privileges over a given
Database and the different Collections or Views. These roles are assigned to users, with each
User having at least one, and potentially multiple Roles.
In order to manage access control, privileges can be granted or revoked for each Role.
Modifications over privileges in the database are covered in the lower part of our metamodel,
which deals with access control. Our metamodel includes the four basic action privileges:
Find, Insert, Update and Remove. These privileges can be granted over certain collections
through theGrantRevokeCollection or,more in detail, over certainfields through theGrantRe-
vokeField.
It is important to note that although at the conceptual level our model is generic and
supports revoking field privileges, MongoDB does not implement field-level access control;
thus, no privileges over individual fields can be directly established for a role or user.
In addition to grant and revoke actions, our model includes SecurityActions that represent
high-level objectives, such as hiding fields or values, to be achieved through the creation of
views, collections, grant and revoke actions.
The aim of the lower part of the metamodel is to make explicit the changes that will be
performed over the database as a result of the security analysis. This also enables the addition
or removal of any security actions before making effective the changes.
Using thismetamodel as reference, the process for obtaining the reverse-engineeredmodel
is as follows:
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1. First, a Database element is created with the name of the database that is reverse engi-
neered.
2. Second, the list of collections is obtained by using the list_collection_names() method.
For each collection, a Collection and a Document element are created and appended to
the Database element. For simplicity, the Document element will hold the set of keys
used in all the documents of the collection, as retrieving all the metadata of each specific
document is unnecessary at this point.
3. Third, for each collection, the set of keys is retrieved and appended to the document of
the collection. This can be done using multiple publicly known methods [24]. For each
key, a Field element is added with its name set to the retrieved key. After all fields have
been set, they are added to the collection and the next collection in the list is processed.
4. Fourth, after all collections have been retrieved, users and roles are retrieved using the
usersInfo command. For each user a User is created along with its associated roles and
privileges over collections. Once all the User and Role elements have been created, they
are appended to the Database element.
After the reverse engineering process, we will have obtained a conceptual model of the
database to be modernized. In order to identify potential security issues, we must perform
an analysis that will start with an ontological analysis of the contents in the database. This
analysis will allow domain experts to tag sensitive collections and properties that should be
restricted, enabling the identification of new views, privileges, and roles that will need to be
implemented or existing ones that should be adjusted.
3.1.1 Data analysis: the ontology
At this stage we will work with the source database in order to detect sensitive data. It
is important to emphasize that the analysis stage can be applied to any NoSQL database
technology used both in the previous phase of reverse engineering and in the next phase of
identification of security issues.
Each field of the database is analyzed searching for sensitive information. One of the
contributions of this proposal is the establishment of the security privileges needed to access
each field of the data set. In order to define the different security privileges, we have followed
the four levels of security clearance defined by U.S. Department of State1: unclassified, con-
fidential, secret, and top secret, although the classifications used in other countries (Canada,
UK, etc.) could be used. We have defined a mapping between the selected security clearance
levels that we have called security levels (SL), and numerical values to facilitate subse-
quent calculations. Therefore, we will use SL=0 (unclassified, all people have access to
the information); SL=1 (confidential, the persons registered in the system can access this
information); SL=2,3 (secret and top secret, only certain people with specific profiles and
characteristics can access this information).
In order to tag the different SL of the database fields to allow their access, we have used
NLP techniques and lexical and ontological resources. In our approach, we have used the
lexical database WordNet 3.12 which contains semantic relations (synonyms, hyponyms,
meronyms, etc.) between words in more than 200 languages. In addition, it was necessary
1 https://www.state.gov/security-clearances (visited on April, 2021).
2 http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn (visited on December, 2019).
123
2216 A. Maté et al.
the help of experts in the specific domain of the source database (in our case study, medical
domain) and in the domain of data protection.3
The labeling process consists of two steps. In the first step, the lexical resource is enriched
with information related to sensitivity. Therefore, WordNet was enriched by adding the SL
to all the concepts; initially all WordNet concepts are labeled with SL=1. Next, the specific
domain expert (a physician, in our case scenario) will update the WordNet concepts related
to his/her domain, distinguishing between SL=2 (concepts that have sensitive information
such as those related to the treatment or diagnosis of the patient) and SL=3 (they have very
sensitive information, for example, the concepts related to the medical specialty Oncology).
Finally, the data protection expert will carry out the same process distinguishing between
SL=2 (for example, the patient’s address) and SL=3 (such as race or religious beliefs among
others).
In the second step, each database field is labeled with a specific SL. Thus, all the field
values are consulted in WordNet. Basically, two cases can occur distinguishing two types of
restrictions: (1) all values have the same level of security (e.g., SL=3) and, consequently,
this SL is assigned to the field (security constraints); (2) the field values have different SL
(e.g., SL=2 and SL=3) and, consequently, distinctions within the same field will be made
(fine-grain security constraints). The restrictions are explained below:
1. Security constraints. They are defined at the field level. Security constraints are specified
when the information contained in a field (after the processing of all instances) has the
same level of security; that is, there is no information within the field that is more sensible
than another one. For example, a race field is sensible. The information which contains
is always sensible regardless of the values of the field. Therefore, a specific security level
of SL=3, ’top secret’, might be required for queries.
2. Fine-grain security constraints. They are specified at the field content level. These con-
straints are described to define different security privileges of a field depending on its
content. For example, to query a field which represents the medical specialty of patients
might require a generic SL=2. However, patients with terminal diseases might require
a higher SL (for example, SL=3). Thus, a user with SL=3 could see all the patients
(including those with terminal diseases), whereas the users with lower SL only could see
patients with non-terminal diseases.
A more detailed description of the entire process will be explained in Sect. 4.3 with our
case study.
3.2 Identification of security issues: security improvements
Once we have performed the data analysis using the expert tagging and the ontology, we will
have a set of fields (properties in the MongoDB metamodel) tagged with different security
levels. In order to identify potential security issues automatically, we will proceed as follows:
First, for each collection C , a security level array Sc will be defined, including a triple
(attribute, security level, condition) for each attribute in the collection. The security values
will be defined according to the security levels specified in the previous step, such that:
SC = (〈a1, s1, c1〉, 〈a2, s2, c2〉 . . . 〈an, sn, cn〉) (1)
3 This person will be the responsible for processing the data of the organization or company (according to the
General Data Protection Regulation, European Union, [25,26] is the person who decides the purpose and the
way in which the organization’s data are processed).
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In this sense, if a field presents multiple security levels, it will be repeated, and the
associated condition stored for later use. If no condition is specified, ci will be null. For each
array, the maximum and minimum value will be calculated. If they are equal, the array will
be compressed into a single number that represents the security level of the entire collection.
An example of (1) would be Patient , where each value represents the security level si of an
attribute ai (the names have been omitted for simplicity):
SPatient =
[
1 2 1 1 2 3 2
]
Afterward, we will obtain the role access matrix RA of the system, composed by role
access arrays. A role array i , contains the name of the role ri and the associated set of
permissions Ai to access each collection. There is a role array for each role in the system
except for the admin role, which forcibly has access to everything. Therefore, the role access
matrix is defined as:
RA = (〈r1, A1〉, 〈r2, A2, 〉 . . . 〈rn, An〉), Admin /∈ R (2)
where Ai is a list of pairs 〈c, p〉, denoting that the role has access to the collection named
c if p = 1 or that his access is restricted if p = 0. The role access matrix (2), such as the
one shown in the following for the medical database, will be used in conjunction with the













The user access matrixU A is obtained in a similar fashion, using the permissions of users
in the systems instead of the roles.
Once we have the security arrays and the access matrices, we obtain the extended access
matrix for roles RE A and usersUEA by multiplying the access level of each role/user with
the security level array of each collection. Essentially each row of the RE A matrix will be:
RE Ai = (〈ri , A1〉 × Sc1, . . . , 〈ri , An〉 × Scn) (3)





t ype time medical medical2 name . . .
Role_1 2 1 2 3 1 . . .
Role_2 0 0 0 0 1 . . .
Role_3 2 1 2 3 0 . . .




The extended access matrices are used as input for the analysis. The security issues
identified during the process will depend on the choice of the user across three different
security policies:
1. Exclusive access to highly sensitive data per user (only one user can access to each highly
sensitive field/collection)
2. (Default) Exclusive access to highly sensitive data per role
3. Without exclusive access
Taking into account the selected policy, we will analyze the accessibility of each field as
follows:
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1. For each set of rows that are equal to each other within the role matrix, we will identify
these roles as “Duplicate Roles”, suggesting the removal of duplicates in the security
issues list. The users that had their roles removed will be assigned the remaining role.
Accordingly, the security action that summarizes this process, role removal, will include
eliminating duplicate roles as well as corresponding grant role actions.
2. For security level 1 collections and fields, we will identify any 0’s in the column of the
matrix. Since these fields are considered as “generally accessible”, we will report the list
of roles without access for review, suggesting that access is given to them in the security
issues list. The security action will be tagged as show field, with the corresponding grant
collection actions.
3. For security level 2 collections and fields, we will identify any columns without 0’s.
For these collections and fields, a warning will be included in the security issues list. In
order to deal with this security issue we will proceed depending on whether the entire
collection has a security level higher than 1 or if higher security is set only for selected
fields:
(a) If the entire collection has a security level higher than 1, then the suggested modifi-
cation will be the removal of all the access rights and the creation of a new role with
access to all level 1 collections as well as the restricted collection. The associated
security action, hide collection, will include the revoke access action to all roles and
will grant access to the new role to be created.
(b) If only selected fields are affected, then the suggested modification will be to create a
new View that contains level 1 fields. All existing roles with access to the collection
will have their access removed and will be granted access to the view instead. Finally,
a new role will be created with access to all level 1 collections as well as the restricted
collection. This actions will be aggregated into the hide field security action.
4. For security level 3 collections and fields, first, we will identify any columns with two
or more non-zero values. Since these are highly sensitive data, it is expected that only
the admin and a specific role have access to them. Therefore, a warning will be included
in the security issues list. If the exclusive role access policy has been selected, then the
removal of all access rights from existing roles will be suggested, creating a new one with
exclusive access as in the previous step. These actions will be related to a hide field or
hide collection security action. Second, we will identify any rows with two or more level
3 field access. If these fields pertain to different collections, it would mean that a single
role has access to sensitive information from multiple collections. Therefore, in order to
improve security, a warning will be included in the security list and the role will keep its
access only to the first collection. A new role for each collection with highly sensitive
information that cannot be accessed by any other roles will be added. These actions will
be related to a hide field security action.
5. In the case of fine-grained constraints, (i.e., fields that contain multiple security levels
depending on their contents) such as the “medical_specialty field”, a new View will
be created for the lower security level using the $redact operator from MongoDB and
the condition previously stored. In this way, the original collection will retain all data,
including highly sensitive information, while the other two views allow access to gen-
erally available and sensitive information, respectively. In these cases an additional role
will be created that has access to all level 1 collections as well as the restricted view but
not to the original collection. All these actions will be related to the hide value security
action.
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For users in the database, steps 2–4 will be repeated, identifying users without access to
general collections as well as sensitive data to which all users have access. In addition, if the
exclusive user access policy has been selected, step 5 will be repeated using the extended
user access matrix, suggesting the removal of the rights of all users with access to highly
sensitive data so that the database administrator can choose which users should maintain the
access.
4 Case study
In order to prove the validity of our proposal, we have applied it to a case study within
the medical domain. In the following subsections, we present: the source data, the reverse
engineering process to extract the originalmodel, the process to identify sensitive data in order
to obtain the security recommendations, and finally, the generation of the security-enhanced
model.
4.1 Source data
With respect to the database selection, we have used the structured data extracted from
patients with diabetes used in the study developed by Strack et al. [27], extracted from the
Health Facts database (Cerner Corporation, Kansas City, MO), a national data warehouse
that collects comprehensive clinical (electronic medical) records across hospitals throughout
the USA. It contains personal data of the patients and all the information related to their
admission in the hospital.
The Health Facts data we used were an extract representing 10 years (1999-2008) of
clinical care including 130 hospitals and integrated delivery networks throughout the United
States. The database consists of 41 tables in a fact-dimension schema and a total of 117
features. The database includes 74,036,643 unique encounters (visits) that correspond to
17,880,231 unique patients and 2,889,571 providers.
The data set was created in two steps. First, encounters of interest were extracted from the
database with 55 attributes. Second, preliminary analyses and preprocessing of the data were
performed resulting in only these features (attributes) and encounters that could be used in
further analyses being retained, in other words, features that contain sufficient information.
The full list of the features and their description is provided in [27]. This data set is available
as Supplementary Material available online,4 and it is also in the UCI Machine Learning
Repository.
Finally, the information from the mentioned database for “diabetic” encounters was
extracted. In this way, 101,766 encounters were identified related to diabetic patients. These
data were used in our experiments.
4.2 Reverse engineering
Using the information of diabetic patients, we created an initial MongoDB database repli-
cating the structure of the dataset. The database contains two collections. The first one,
“Admission”, stores all the information regarding the admission of patients. This informa-
tion includes sensitive information such as drugs that have been administrated to the patient
4 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/781670 (visited on December, 2019).
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Fig. 3 Initial database model
or the medical specialty corresponding to their case. The second one, “Patient”, stores infor-
mation regarding patients such as name, gender, race, age or address.
Together with the “Admission” and “Patient” collections, two users with their corre-
sponding roles are created in the database: first, the “Analyst” user and role, with access to
every collection and field in order to manage the database as would be expected in a Data
Warehouse-style database; second, a user and role for querying information about patients
“Patients” that has access to the ‘Patient” collection only.
Using the reverse engineering process presented in Sect. 3.1, we obtain the model shown
in Fig. 3.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, security-wise this would be a poor database model for general
use. There is little security beyond one user having access to only one collection, and there is
no discrimination on whether fields are sensitive or not. Therefore, to show how our process
modernizes database security, our next step will be to be analyze the data at hand in order to
annotate the model, identify security issues, and generate security recommendations.
4.3 Security recommendations extraction
In our example, considering our data model, we analyzed the different fields in order to
establish the security constraints.
We applied the process defined in Sect. 3.1.1. The first step consists on the enrichment
of the lexical resource adding the SL to the concepts. As we have previously mentioned we
have used WordNet 3.1. Initially, the lowest security level (SL=1) was assigned to all the
WordNet terms. These initial values will be modified by an expert according to the specific
domain we were working on.
In our case scenario an expert in medical domain (a physician) will update the concept
security levels by distinguishing sensitive information (SL=2) and very sensitive informa-
tion (SL=3). For instance, the concepts related to the patient’s treatment and the respective
medicaments will be treated as sensitive information (SL=2). On the other hand, the concepts
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Medical_Specialty 
AllergyandImmunology  Pediatrics  Dermatology Endocrinology   Hematology Oncology 




Glizipide   
Drug
Endocrinology-Metabolism
Fig. 4 A fragment of treatment and medical specialty ontologies
related to the patient’s medical specialty will have sensitive information (SL=2). However,
the physician will distinguish the most sensitive specialties (Oncology, etc.) assigning them
the highest security level (SL=3). These new security levels established by the expert will
be updated in WordNet in the following way: the concepts with security levels 2 or 3 are
searched in WordNet. When they are found, the new security level is modified and it is prop-
agated to all their children concepts in the tree structure. This process ends when a leaf is
reached or concepts with security levels greater than the new one are found (this indicates
that the concept security level has been previously modified in the sub-tree). If a concept
is not found in WordNet, it will be enriched with the new concept (the expert will indicate
where it will be inserted).
In Fig. 4, two fragments of WordNet related to the fields treatment and medical specialty
are shown. On the one hand, the expert will assign the SL=2 to the concept Medicament
which will be propagated to their children (Antibacterial, Anticoagulant, Antidiabetic, Met-
formin, Glyburide, etc.). On the other hand, he/she will assign the SL=2 to the concept
Medical_Specialty which will be propagated to their children (Pediatrics, Dermatology,
Hematology, Cardiology, etc.), except the concept Oncology that will have the SL=3.
A similar process will be carried out by the data protection expert to update the SL in all
the concepts of his/her domainwith sensitive information. For example, the expert will assign
the SL=3 to the concept Race which will be propagated to the concepts Asian, Caucasian,
Hispanic, etc.
In order to check that the labeling of the SL carried out by the experts is valid, the Cohen’s
kappa coefficient has been calculated tomeasure the agreement between them [28]. Thus, two
experts in the medical domain and two experts in data protection carried out the labeling of
the SL of the concepts of their respective domains. The results obtained of kappa coefficient
for each domain were higher than 0.75, which are considered excellent.
In the second step, each database field was labeled with a specific SL. Next, we will intro-
duce some examples of the two kinds of constraints that we have previously defined. Suppose
we are analyzing the treatment field. In advance, we ignore the details of the information
stored in this field but its values are already known. After having consulted each one of the
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Fig. 5 Example of enrichment of WordNet
values of the treatment field in WordNet, they are all assigned SL=2. An example of the
use of security constraints would be, given the previous preconditions, setting SL=2 for the
mentioned field.
On the other hand, to illustrate an example of a fine-grain constraint, suppose the field
medical specialty is now analyzed. This field describes, with 84 values, the specialty of the
patient: “dermatology”, “endocrinology”, “pulmonology”, “oncology”, etc. These values are
searched for inWordNet having, in most instances, SL=2. However, it can be seen that some
patients have the value of “oncology” which is the most sensible (SL=3). According this, a
new recommendation will be created for the following stage of modeling.
The final result of the analysis, after applying the constraints set, was:
Patient collection Race: SL=3; Address: SL=2; Remaining fields: SL=1.
Admission collection Treatment: SL=2; Medical specialty: SL=2 (in case of oncology:
SL=3); Diagnosis: SL=2; Remaining fields: SL=1.
It can be highlighted that the application ofNLP techniques is very useful in database fields
where natural language is the way to explain concepts or ideas. For example, in the medical
domain, fields containing information about the encounter with the patient, the diagnosis, or
the medication are very usual. After carrying out an analysis of these textual fields, both the
lexical-morphological (POS tagging) and partial syntactic (partial parsing), we can identify
the main concepts of the text. The application of these NLP techniques also contributes to
dealing effectively with natural language issues, such as ambiguities, ellipses or anaphoric
expressions. Once these key concepts are extracted, the process defined above is carried out
by assigning a security level to a text field.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that a similar problem is tackled by the responsible
for data protection and privacy of an organization or company about document anonymiza-
tion or text sanitization. In these cases, entity recognition techniques (NER, Named Entity
Recognition) from NLP are used to identify sensitive entities or words in order to anonymize
them by generalizing to broader concepts.
With regard to the implementation, WordNet has been converted into JSON format that is
compatible with our database engine. Each of the terms of the fields is searched in WordNet
to assign them a level of security. If a concept does not exist in WordNet, it can be included
as shown in Fig. 5.
In our example, we have focused on the treatment and medical specialty fields to show the
aforementioned constraints. An automatic process is carried out to establish the field security
level. In Fig. 6, the functions to extract the security levels of the Admission collection are
shown.
The result of this stage is a list of security recommendations to be taken into account in
the following stage of modeling. For instance, we have obtained these two recommendations
related to the mentioned fields: (1) the treatment field has the SL=2 (security constraint);
and (2) the medical_specialty field has the SL=2, and if it is Oncology: SL=3 (fine-grain
security constraint).
123
Improving security in NoSQL document databases through… 2223
Fig. 6 Extraction of security levels of Admission collection
4.4 Security-enhancedmodel
Using the information from the previous step, we analyze the access levels using the steps
described in Sect. 3.2.










Combining this information with the security levels identified in the previous step, we
obtain the extended access matrix. For the sake of brevity, all access levels 0 (“Patients”
role does not have access to the “Admission” collection) and 1 (general access for registered
users) are omitted in the paper:
RE AAdmission =
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Using the extended access matrix for roles, our approach identifies the following issues
and recommendations:
• The “address” field in “Patient” can be accessed by all roles (no 0s in the column). The
suggested modification is to create a new view “ViewSL1_Patient” removing all security
level 2 and 3 fields. The “Analyst” and “Patients” roles have their access to the collection
“Patient” removed and are granted instead access to “ViewSL1_Patient”. A new role,
“Patients_SL3” is created with access to the original collection.
• No further SL=2 issues are detected. The access matrix is updated.
• The “race” field in “Patient” could initially be accessed by all roles (no 0s in the column).
With the modifications made no further changes are needed to deal with this issue.
• The “Analyst” role could initially access highly sensitive information (multiple security
level 3 fields) from different collections. With the modifications made no further changes
are needed to deal with this issue.
• The “medical specialization” field in “Admission” has two security levels (2 and 3), yet
only one user role exists “Analyst”, which has access to all the information. The suggested
modification is to create a new view “ViewSL2_Admission” using the $redact operator to
remove the information related to oncology patients. A new role “Admission_Oncology”
is proposed, which has access to the original collection. “Analyst” role has its access
revoked and instead is granted access to the new view. All these operations are related to
a hide value security action. The access matrix is updated.
The resulting model summarizing the new structure of the database and the actions to
be taken is shown in Fig. 7, where the new roles and views are highlighted in gray color.
Additionally, since all the new elements and modifications are related to their corresponding
security action, it is easy to locate and remove undesired changes by removing the corre-
sponding security action.
As a result of the analysis, our approach suggests the creation of two new roles,
“Patients_SL3” and “Admission_Oncology”, that have exclusive access to highly sensitive
information. Existing roles (and therefore users) have their access revoked and can be granted
access again by assigning them the new roles. In this way, the database now has a security
hierarchy that ensures data are adequately protected without duplicity of roles.
5 Discussion and limitations
Our proposed approach allows users to be aware and introduce security mechanisms into
existing NoSQL document databases. Our approach provides users with a clear view of the
main components in their document database, not only warning users about potential security
flaws, but also providing the mechanisms to tackle them. Still, there are some limitations that
must be taken into account when applying the proposal.
First and foremost, the specific implementation of the reverse engineering process is
dependent on the MongoDB API. While MongoDB is the most popular document database
available, the reverse engineering process (i) depends on the evolution of the API and (ii)
would need to be adapted for other NoSQL document databases. Nevertheless, the constructs
used in our proposal (Collections, Fields, Roles, etc.) are generic, and the rest of the process
including the ontological and security analysis can be applied to any document-oriented
database since they are independent of the specific technology used. As such, our proposal
would be applicable to other popular NoSQL document databases such as Apache CouchDB
or Amazon DynamoDB by updating the API calls used during the process.
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Fig. 7 Security enhanced database model
The case for other NoSQL technologies (key-value, columnar graph, etc.) is different
however. As database structures differ more and more, more profound changes are required,
not only in the analysis process but also in the structural part of the metamodel. As such,
it is expected that the process requires certain effort to be adapted for example to columnar
NoSQL databases, where the way that information is stored maintains certain similarities but
structures are different. More radical changes would be needed in the case of graph NoSQL
databases, where not only the structure is completely different but also the emphasis is put
on the relationships. Therefore, in these cases the process would need to be entirely redone
from scratch.
Second, the current reverse-engineering process does not obtain an exact model of the
database. Most notably, it does not differentiate on its own between Collections and Views
in the database to be modernized. This is due to limitations in the current version of the
MongoDB API. Nevertheless, the analysis process is the same, since both elements need to
be checked for security issues. Furthermore, the modernization itself involves modifications
that do not remove or alter existing views and collections, only creates new ones and alters
permissions that users have over those that already exist.
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Third, the process could be optimized by carrying out the ontological analysis at the same
time that the reverse engineering process is performed, thereby increasing the performance
by reducing the number of reads over the database. However, this would imply coupling both
processes andmaking the ontological analysis dependent on the specific database technology
used. As such, we have preferred maintaining decoupled both steps in the process, making it
easier to adapt the process to other technologies, including non document-oriented database
technologies.
Fourth, the proposed process focuses on security issues related to access control. Thus,
other security issues such as vulnerability to attacks,weak user passwords, etc., are considered
out of the scope of the proposal. Therefore, these issues would need to be tackled by existing
approaches that model attack scenarios and test the security of user accounts.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed the first modernization approach for introducing security in
NoSQL document databases improving the security of their association information systems
and applications. It identifies and enables security mechanisms that had been overlooked or
not even been considered during the initial implementation. Our approach adapts to each
domain by using an ontology that allows users to specify what information can be considered
sensitive or highly sensitive. Then, it automatically analyzes the data and the database struc-
ture to identify security issues and propose security mechanisms that enable fine-grained
access control, even when by default this level of security is not supported by the existing
technology. As such, our approach can be adapted to any domain and reduces the effort and
knowledge required to introduce security in NoSQL document databases.
As part of our future work, we plan to cover the entire cycle, automatically deriving the
code that is required to modify the database. Furthermore, we plan to expand our approach
to other NoSQL technologies, such as columnar and graph-based databases.
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